Mr. President, some of my colleagues are suggesting

that as a result of yesterday's election in Iraq, the United States

needs an exit strategy, that we should begin to withdraw troops, and

that we should set a timetable for bringing the rest of our military

men and women home. That is a very appealing thought.

I can think of about 3,000 families in Tennessee of the 278th Cavalry

of the National Guard whose husbands and wives and sons and daughters

have interrupted their lives for up to 18 months. And they are now in

northern Iraq. Their families would like to have them home. I can think

of families around Fort Campbell and Nashville. They would like to have

their loved ones home. I think of the $80 billion the President is

going to ask us to spend, and I can think of 80 billion ways to spend

it on education and improving our competitiveness. It is a very

appealing thought--to bring the troops home.

But we don't need an exit strategy in Iraq. The United States needs a

success strategy in Iraq. If we are to succeed in Iraq, I am afraid

that means those troops are likely to have to stay there for a while

longer.

Yesterday, the Iraqis did for themselves what we haven't been able to

do for them in 22 months: they isolated the terrorists. The count was

about 7 million or 8 million to 5,000 or 10,000--voting Iraqis versus

terrorists.

In October of 2003, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wrote a memorandum

which was widely circulated around Washington. He said:

Concerning the overall war on terror, Secretary Rumsfeld went on to

ask:

The Rumsfeld memorandum leaked, and some accused the Secretary of not

having all the answers. I am glad we had a Secretary who is willing to

ask the questions that he didn't know the answers to. He was worried

that our actions in Iraq and being successful in the war were, in the

postwar time, inflaming Arab opinion in such a way that we were

creating more terrorists than we were destroying.

I know a lot of wise people around Washington, DC, who have been

thinking about Secretary Rumsfeld's question since October of 2003. I

have yet to hear one of them come up with a very good answer to his

question.

How do we in the postwar conflict keep from creating more terrorists

than we are destroying? The answers to the question come from all

sides.

We in Congress have discussed, for example, more public relations,

more television, more radio programming, more cultural exchanges. Those

are all good ideas. They are important parts of effective public

diplomacy. I hope we do them. But yesterday we witnessed a much better

answer to Secretary Rumsfeld's question: elections; elections giving

people a voice and a stake in the future of their own country. Those

elections yesterday isolated the terrorists. That was the most

important lesson of yesterday. It was 7 million or 8 million for

democracy and 5,000 or 10,000 for the terrorists. It wasn't the

Americans who were in the 7 or 8 million; it was the Iraqis. It was the

Iraqis.

We discovered that we know how to give people their freedom. We have

a military strong enough to do that virtually anywhere in the world. We

did it in Iraq, and with stunning success, in 3 weeks toppling Saddam

Hussein's government. We can give most countries their freedom in a few

weeks or a few months, but we are being reminded in Iraq that building

a democracy takes a long time. And people have to build a democracy for

themselves. We can't do it for them.

We should know that from our own history. The Declaration of

Independence was written in 1776. Our Constitution was signed in 1787.

But women didn't receive the right to vote in America until 1920. It

took 133 years. Blacks were enslaved and counted as three-fifths of a

person by our Constitution until our Civil War, and they didn't receive

full voting rights until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 180 years after

the signing of our Constitution. Even today, the United States of

America is still a work in progress. We are the oldest democracy in the

world. There is no such thing as an instant democracy. We, of all

democracies, should understand that.

We also could learn some lessons from our role in nation building in

the world. We spent 8 years in Germany and Japan. We are still in

Bosnia and Kosovo.

According to this book, ``America's Role in Nation Building: From

Germany to Iraq,'' a RAND study by Ambassador James Dobbins and others,

``There is no quick route to nation building. Five years seems to be

the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy.''

This is a book about nation building in Germany to Afghanistan with

lessons for Iraq. We have plenty of experience in nation building since

World War II, and the lessons from those experiences are documented in

this book and many other places: Any time we decide to engage in nation

building, it is going to take more troops, more time, more money, and

certainly more sacrifice than we at first thought when we invaded Iraq.

That doesn't mean we should reconsider our presence in Iraq. We are

there. We need to finish what we started. We need to get the job done.

It does suggest that in the future we should think carefully about the

number of troops, the amount of time, the amount of money, and the

amount of sacrifice it takes when we engage in nation building.

I believe the Bush administration as well as the Congress has some

responsibilities going forward. First, as far as the administration

goes, I would like to see the administration be more specific about its

success strategy in Iraq. I mentioned last week in the Senate the

Washington Post op-ed by two former Secretaries of State, Henry

Kissinger and George Shultz. They argue, eloquently and in detail, that

we should not set, as some of my colleagues have suggested, a specific

timetable for pulling out our troops. We do not need an exit strategy.

But they went further than the administration has gone so far in

outlining the framework for a success strategy. These are the kinds of

questions they ask in their framework.

Are we waging ``one war'' in which political and military efforts are

mutually reinforcing? Are the institutions we are helping to build

sufficiently coordinated? Is our strategic goal to achieve complete

security in at least some key towns and major communications routes as

opposed to 100 percent in every town and 100 percent security on every

communication route? Do we have a policy for eliminating sanctuaries in

neighboring territories, such as Syria and Iran? Are we designing a

policy that could produce results for the people and prevent civil

strife for control of the state and its oil revenue? Are we maintaining

public support of the United States? Are we gaining international

understanding?

They went on to conclude:

That is the administration's responsibility at this stage. We have a

new Secretary. We have a new election. We are being asked to

appropriate 80 billion new dollars. I would like to hear a more

specific success strategy.

We have our own responsibilities in the Congress. Our responsibility,

now that we have authorized this war--we authorized it with 77 votes in

this Chamber. Now that we have authorized this war, we have the

responsibility to have the stomach to see it through to the end and not

begin talking about premature exit strategies before we finish what we

started.

The focus should not be on what day in July or August we will get

out. Instead, we should be asking, for example, what are we willing to

do to help provide the security needed so that elections in October and

December are successful?

Yesterday's election was the first election. It was the first strong

signal from the Iraqis that by a vote of 7 or 8 million to 5,000 or

10,000, they prefer democracy to terrorism. It did something that we

could not do ourselves in 22 months: It isolated the terrorists in

public opinion. There will be another election in October. There will

be another election in December. And we should be talking about what we

can do to help those elections be successful. Let's send another

message isolating terrorists--not the United States, but the Iraqis. We

will give them that opportunity two more times.

What can we do to train Iraqis to take over their own defense and to

establish a constitutional government? What can we do to encourage

Iraqi neighbors to allow a success strategy

to continue? Those are the questions we should be asking, and the

answers to those questions will produce a success strategy.

At some point, one thing we can do to isolate terrorists in the

Middle East is to leave Iraq. Then Iraqis are defending Iraq. All of us

want that as soon as possible. Iraqis want that as soon as possible.

But to abandon Iraq before we have implemented a success strategy is

abandoning a country we have led to risk its lives in order to vote,

and abandoning the brave Americans and those from other countries who

have fought, bled, and died to give Iraqis their freedom and to give

them an opportunity to govern themselves.

In 1994, I met a man named Larry Joyce in Chicago. He worked for the

American Heart Association. Larry Joyce had been in Vietnam. He was

about my age. He sought me out because he wanted anyone who might be in

public life to learn the lessons he and his family had learned in

Somalia. Larry Joyce's son, Casey Joyce, had been killed in Somalia.

The lesson Larry Joyce wanted me to know and wanted every Member of

this Senate to know and every policymaker to know was this: Before we

engage in a military mission, we should do three things: One, we should

have a specific mission; two, we should have more than sufficient force

to complete the job; and he said, three, most importantly, we should

have the stomach to see the mission through all the way to the end.

His greatest complaint about the American Government in Somalia was

not the mission, not the force, but that we did not have the stomach to

see all the way through to the end the mission in which his son was

killed.

Larry Joyce himself has now died, but I remember that conversation. I

think of his son. When I think about this war and committing American

men and women to Iraq or any other place in the world, I think about

seeing that mission all the way through to the end.

That is why I react badly to the talk of my colleagues who suggest an

exit strategy based on some artificial date. Leaving Iraq prematurely

would undermine every objective we have in the war on terror and in the

Middle East. I am disappointed to hear talk of an exit approach. I

would like to hear more in this Chamber and more from the

administration and more in this country about a success strategy in

Iraq.

Yesterday's election was a thrilling event. For the first time in 22

months it answered Secretary Rumsfeld's question of October 2003, How

do we isolate the terrorists? If we do not do it, the Iraqi people do

it, 7 or 8 million of them, versus 5,000 to 10,000 terrorists. They

isolated the terrorists.

We should not be talking about leaving Iraq before we are finished.

We should be talking today about those October elections, about those

December elections, and what we can do in our country and in Iraq to

help the Iraqis have the opportunity to build a constitutional

government and to be in a position in October and December to once

again send a message to the world that they prefer democracy to

terrorism and that they, the Iraqis, are isolating the terrorists by a

vote of millions of Iraqis to a few thousand terrorists.

I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.